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INTEGRATION OF THE CORPORATE AND
PERSONAL INCOME TAXES AND THE ALI
PROPOSALS
Thomas D. Griffith*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under current law, corporate source income is subject to
double taxation: at the corporate level when earned by the
corporation and at the personal income tax level when distrib-
uted to shareholders. This system has been attacked as both
inequitable and inefficient; in recent years, there has been in-
creased interest in and debate surrounding the integration of
the corporate and personal income taxes from within the gov-
ernment itself and among commentators.'
The first part of this article will examine the justifications
for, and criticisms of, the corporate income tax. First, this ar-
ticle will examine the "entity" and "conduit" views of the cor-
poration, analyzing the argument that the corporate tax
places an unfair burden on taxpayers, in general, and those in
lower brackets, in particular. Second, it will evaluate the con-
tention that corporations should be taxed on a benefits re-
ceived theory. Third, it will examine the effect of the corpo-
rate levy on the allocation of capital between the corporate
and noncorporate sectors of the economy as well as its impact
on the allocation between savings and consumption. Fourth, it
will analyze the impact of the corporate tax on a firm's choice
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1. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX
REFORM (1977); C. McLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? (1979);
Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and
Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977); McLure, The Case for Integrating the Income Taxes,
28 NAT'L TAX J. 255 (1975); Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and
Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 719 (1981). For a brief overview of the
integration debate, see D. KAHN & P. CANN, CORPORATE TAXATION 36-58 (1979). For a
discussion of integration in developing nations, see Lent, Corporation Income Tax
Structure in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L MONErARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 722
(1977).
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between debt and equity financing. Finally, it will explore the
role of the tax on a corporation's decision to retain or dis-
tribute earnings.
The second part of this article will evaluate two different
"integration" proposals: dividend relief and the proposal con-
tained in a study by the reporter of the American Law Insti-
tute's Federal Income Tax Project." A comparison of the two
proposals leads to the conclusion that the ALI proposal is a
more desirable method of reform because it reduces the dis-
tortions caused by the corporate income tax, but prevents
windfall gains to current owners of corporate stock.
II. THE CORPORATION AS A PROPER OBJECT OF TAXATION
A. The "Entity" and "Conduit" Views of the Corporation
1. The Corporation as an Independent "Entity"
A traditional justification for the corporate income tax is
that corporations are legal entities distinct from their share-
holders and thus are proper objects of an independent tax.3
Proponents of this view note that corporations have the right
to own property, to make contracts, and to sue and be sued;
4
that corporate existence is independent of the lives of its
shareholders or officers, that is, the shareholders may pass
away while the corporation goes on, perhaps forever;5 and that
individual shareholders are neither legally entitled to earnings
until dividends are declared, nor liable for corporate debts.6
As Justice Holmes stated in Klein v. Board of Supervisors,
"[t]he corporation is a person and its ownership is a noncon-
ductor that makes it impossible to attribute an interest in its
property to its members."'7
The separation of shareholders from the corporation is
2. AMERICAN LAW INST. FED. INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS OF
THE AMERICAN LAW INST. ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS AND RE-
PORTER'S STUDY ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS (19S2) [hereinafter cited as ALl Study].
3. For a discussion of the corporation as a "person" see S. REAMONN, THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF THE CORPORATE TAX (1970). The tax treatment of legal entities in general
is discussed in Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 13
(1972).
4. R. GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 9-10, 12 (1951).
5. Id. at 10.
6. Id. at 11-12; Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Pub-
licly-Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623, 637 (1967).
7. 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930).
[Vol. 23
INTEGRATION OF ALI PROPOSALS
especially sharp in large, publicly-held enterprises where
shareholders are unable to exercise any effective control over
corporate policy.' Corporations, especially in oligopolistic in-
dustries, may seek to maximize their own growth at the ex-
pense of maximizing profits which would inure to their
shareholders.'
The taxation of corporations on an entity theory is no
longer widely accepted in the United States; 0 however, in Eu-
rope it is generally considered legitimate to tax the corpora-
tion as an independent entity, even in those countries that
have adopted dividend relief.1"
2. The "Conduit" Theory
Proponents of integration, on the other hand, argue that
"the burden of all taxes must ultimately fall on individuals' 12
and that the corporation "can best be characterized as a 'con-
duit' through which income earned in the corporation is
passed through to shareholders as dividends or retained earn-
ings.""3 Supporters of the conduit theory acknowledge that
corporations are often treated as "persons" for legal purposes
and that shareholders of publicly-held corporations generally
play no part in corporate decisions but they state that this
does not alter the fact that corporate income ultimately inures
to the benefit of shareholders and thus it should be taxed to
them at their individual marginal rates."'
3. The "Double Taxation" Argument
Adherents to the conduit theory argue that the dual tax
structure violates the basic tax principles of horizontal and
8. R. GOODE, supra note 4, at 16.
9. See Baumol, On the Theory of Oligopoly, 25 ECONOMICA 187 (1958); William-
son, Profit, Growth and Sales Maximization, 33 ECONOMICA 1 (1966).
10. A few notable exceptions exist. See, e.g., R. GOODE, supra note 4, at 203-04;
Surrey, Reflections on "Integration" of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes,
28 NAT'L TAX J. 335 (1975).
11. See Gourevitch, Corporate Tax Integration: The European Experience, 31
TAX LAW. 65, 70, 86 n.45 (1977).
12. Warren, supra note 1, at 719.
13. McLure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The
Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 H.Adv. L. REv. 532, 535 (1975).
See also, Klein, supra note 3, at 54.
14. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL [CANADIAN] COMMISSION ON TAXATION 3 (1966)[hereinafter cited as CARTER COMMISSION]; McLure, supra note 13, at 535.
19831
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
vertical equity.15 Horizontal equity is said to be violated be-
cause corporate source income is taxed at a different rate than
other income, causing individuals with the same income to
bear different tax burdens. 6 Vertical equity is said to be vio-
lated because lower bracket taxpayers are "overtaxed" on
their corporate source income to a greater extent than upper
bracket taxpayers.
17
Under current law, corporate source income is subject to
three separate taxes. Corporate profits are subject to the cor-
porate income tax, at rates ranging from 15% on the first
$25,000 of income to 46% on income over $100,000.18 Divi-
dends are taxed to the shareholders receiving them at their
individual marginal rates.'9 Gains from the sale of corporate
stock or from qualifying redemptions are taxed at long-term
capital gains rates, if holding requirements are met, and such
gains benefit from a 60% exclusion from income of the
amount of the gain, as well as from deferral of taxation until
the gain is realized.2
As a result of this dual taxation system, currently distrib-
uted corporate source income is taxed more heavily than
noncorporate source income. For example, $100 of
noncorporate source income to a 50% taxpayer will be subject
to a tax of $50, while the same amount of corporate source
income will be subject to a tax of $73.21 This additional $23
15. McLure, supra note 13, at 535.
16. Id. at 537-42.
17. Id. at 536-42. In certain cases, a top bracket taxpayer might pay a lower tax
rate on his corporate source income than on his other income because of the advan-
tages of deferral and bail-out at capital gains rates. While the possibility of actual tax
savings has been sharply cut back by the reduction of the top personal rate from 70%
to 50%, some savings are still possible. The progressive rate structure of the corpo-
rate tax allows a top bracket taxpayer to gain an advantage from deferral by investing
in small closely-held corporations whose tax rate may be well below 50%. These cor-
porations often offer the opportunity to remove profits at capital gains rates through
redemptions or liquidations. Moreover, a taxpayer who holds shares in a nondividend
paying corporation until his death will avoid the personal tax entirely because of the
step-up in basis under I.R.C. § 1014 if his shares are redeemed by his heirs.
18. I.R.C. § 11 (Prentice-Hall 1983).
19. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (Prentice-Hall 1982).
20. I.R.C. § 1202 (Prentice-Hall 1982).
21. The $73 figure is derived as follows:
tax at corporate level - .46 ($100) = $46
tax on net amount paid out
to shareholder as a dividend = .50 [(1-.46)($100)] = $27
Total Tax Burden $73
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represents a 46% increase in the tax burden.
For the lower-bracket taxpayer, the "overtaxation" is
even greater in both percentage and absolute terms. A 20%
taxpayer, for example, would pay a total tax of $56.80 on $100
of corporate source income as compared to a $20 tax on $100
of noncorporate source income. This additional $36.80 repre-
sents a 184% increase in the tax burden for the 20%
taxpayer.
The apparent "overtaxation" of corporation shareholders
disappears, however, if market adjustments in the price of
corporate stock to reflect the additional burden of the tax are
considered. Assume that all corporate source income is taxed
at a 46% rate and is distributed immediately as dividends to
shareholders. For X, a 50% taxpayer, the effective tax rate on
corporate source income would be 73%, while the tax rate on
noncorporate source income would be 50%. A $100 per year
pre-tax income stream from noncorporate investment thus
yields $50 to X after taxes, while the same income stream
from corporate investment yields only $27. Assuming equal
risk, X would invest in noncorporate equity.
Y, a zero bracket taxpayer, would also prefer non-corpo-
rate investment since $100 of pre-tax noncorporate income
would yield a net $100, while the same amount of corporate
income would yield only $54. Thus, for an individual at both
the highest and lowest personal tax rates, a noncorporate in-
vestment generates 85% more income after-taxes.
Because the after-tax return is greater on noncorporate
than on corporate equity, investment flows to the
noncorporate sector, reducing the return on noncorporate eq-
uity and increasing the return on corporate equity. This flow
continues until the after-tax return on investment in each sec-
tor is equal. 2 Since at this equilibrium, the returns on
noncorporate and corporate equity are equal, the burden of a
"double tax" on purchasers of corporate shares is eliminated.
Where all corporate earnings are distributed currently,
noncorporate investment is preferred to corporate investment
to the same extent by both lower and upper-bracket taxpay-
ers. Modification of a 100% payout rate, however, makes in-
The general solution is TI + p[(l-c)I], where T= total tax burden, 1= corporate
source income, c - corporate tax rate, and p = personal tax rate.
22. See Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL.
EcON. 215, 224 (1962).
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vestment in corporate equity relatively more desirable for top
bracket taxpayers because the burden of the corporate tax is
offset by deferral of the personal tax.2"
To illustrate, assume that X, a 50% taxpayer, invests
$100 in noncorporate equity yielding a 10% pre-tax return
with all earnings reinvested after the payment of the individ-
ual income tax. At the end of ten years, X's $100 will have
grown to $162.89.1' Now assume that instead X invests in cor-
porate equity yielding a 10% pre-tax return with earnings re-
tained and reinvested by the corporation after paying 46%
corporate tax. At the end of ten years, X's stock is redeemed
and the gain taxed at long-term capital gains rates. Here, X's
$100 will have grown to $155.36.11 This is less than the yield
from noncorporate investment, but because of the deferral of
the personal tax and preferential capital gains treatment, the
noncorporate investment yields only 4.8% more than the
corporate.
The disadvantage of corporate investment in comparison
to noncorporate is much greater for low bracket taxpayers. Y,
a zero bracket taxpayer, pays no tax on noncorporate earn-
ings, so a ten-year $100 investment will yield $259.37. Y also
pays no tax on his capital gains from his corporate investment
when the stock is redeemed, but because of the corporate tax
a ten-year investment of $100 in corporate equity with 100%
retentions will yield only $169.20. For Y, the noncorporate in-
vestment yields 53.3% more than the corporate investment.
Since corporate investment is worth relatively more to
top bracket taxpayers, a smaller discount is required to induce
them to purchase corporate shares than to induce lower
bracket taxpayers to purchase such shares. Assuming corpo-
rate and noncorporate investments are equally risky and indi-
viduals have perfect information, all individuals with marginal
tax rates above a certain level will invest in corporate equity,
while those in brackets below that level will make
23. See McLure, supra note 13, at 536-42.
24. The general solution is V=W[1 + r(1-p)]Y, where V = value of investment
at end of term, W = wealth at time of initial investment, r = pre-tax rate of return,
p = personal tax rate, and y = years held. This notation is consistent with that used
in Warren, supra note 1.
25. The general solution is V=(1-k)W[l+r(1-c)]Y + kW where V = value of
investment at end of term, W = wealth at time of initial investment, k = capital
gains rate, c - corporate tax rate, r = pre-tax rate of return, and y = years held.
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noncorporate investments.26 If, as is likely, the discount on
corporate stock is greater than that which would be required
to induce a 50% taxpayer to invest, top bracket taxpayers will
be able to purchase stock at prices such that their after-tax
return from corporate investments will be substantially
greater than their return from noncorporate investments.
Suppose, for example, that stock is discounted so that a
30% taxpayer is indifferent between corporate and
noncorporate investment. Again, assuming a ten-year invest-
ment of $100 with a 10% pre-tax return, a 30% taxpayer
would receive $196.72 from a noncorporate investment, while
a corporate investment with 100% retentions followed by a
redemption would yield $160.90. Thus, for a 30% taxpayer
noncorporate investment is worth 22.3% more than corporate
investment. To reflect this, a share of corporate stock repre-
senting $100 of assets would sell for only $81.77. This price is
a bargain for the 50% taxpayer who values noncorporate as-
sets only 4.8% more than corporate and would be willing to
pay $95.42 for the stock. Thus, the corporate tax undermines
the progressive rate structure by enabling high bracket tax-
payers to purchase shares at prices discounted to reflect in-
vestments by individuals in brackets lower than their own.27
The corporate tax may also reduce the rate of return on
noncorporate investment if it induces a shift in capital from
corporate to noncorporate equity.2 8 Such a reduction will be
regressive if investors in noncorporate equity tend to be in
lower brackets than investors in corporate equity.
The actual market, of course, is far more complex than
the model presented here and individual investment choices
are more diverse. Upper bracket taxpayers, for example, are
more likely than those in lower brackets to invest in corpora-
26. See Feldstein & Slemrod, Personal Taxation, Portfolio Choice, and the Ef-fect of the Corporation Income Tax, 88 J. POL. ECON. 854, 856-57 (1980). The authors
point out that Harberger's assumption that the after-tax yields on corporate and
noncorporate investment are equal at equilibrium cannot be true for both high and
low income investors. If unequal after-tax yields are incompatible with equilibrium,
both classes of investors cannot own both types of assets. Feldstein and Slemrod ex-
plain the fact that low and high income taxpayers do own both types of assets as a
result of the desire of individual investors to diversify their portfolios.
27. A similar windfall is available to top bracket taxpayers who purchase tax-
exempt city and state bonds if the rate of return on those bonds is high enough in
relation to taxable bonds to attract taxpayers in less than the 50% bracket.
28. See Harberger, supra note 22, at 219 (in the long-run, the corporate tax will
depress the return to all capital).
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tions that retain all or most of their earnings29 and individuals
may wish to invest in both corporate and noncorporate equity
to diversify their portfolios.30
4. Existing Theories Are Insufficient
Neither the entity nor the conduit theory provides a sat-
isfactory answer to the question of whether the corporate tax
is desirable. Supporters of the entity theory correctly point
out that the widely-held corporation has an existence distinct
from that of its shareholders, but they fail to show how this
justifies an independent corporate tax. Supporters of the con-
duit theory fail to show that the corporate levy leads to unjust
"double taxation" 3' if stock prices are discounted to reflect
the tax.
B. The Benefit Theory of the Corporation Tax
The corporate income tax traditionally has been justified
as a payment for the benefits of using the corporate form of
doing business. The United States Supreme Court justified
the tax on this basis in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.32 Justice Day,
speaking for the Court, described the tax as "an excise upon
the particular privilege of doing business in a corporate capac-
ity,"38 noting that the corporate form of doing business offers
such important benefits as limited liability of shareholders,
ready transferability of shares, and immortality of the corpo-
ration.8" These and other advantages of the corporate form
are essential to large, complex business enterprises, but they
are an inadequate justification for separate tax on corporate
29. The ability of taxpayers to target their corporate investments according to
their marginal tax rates reduces the effects of the corporate tax. A model separating
corporate investors into high and low income grounds found the impact of the tax of
resource allocation to be only one-third of that indicated by a model that fails to
separate the two groups. See Feldstein & Slemrod, supra note 26, at 861-62.
30. See Feldstein & Slemrod, supra note 26, at 856-57.
31. Richard Goode points out that the term "double taxation" is not a helpful
one because its emotional content may lead people to reject the corporate tax system
without further analysis. The important issue, he contends, is not "double taxation,"
but the impact of the tax as compared with other forms of taxation. Goode suggests
substituting the more neutral terms "relative overtaxation" or "relative undertaxa-
tion." See Goode, The Postwar Corporation Tax Structure, in How SHOULD CORPO-
RATIONS BE TAXED? 46 (Tax Inst. ed. 1946).
32. 220 U.S. 107 (1910).
33. Id. at 151.
34. Id. at 162.
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profits.
The United States tax system seldom levies taxes on a
benefits received basis. High bracket taxpayers may benefit
more than low bracket taxpayers from government services,
but the benefits received by individuals bear little relationship
to their relative tax burden. The poorest members of society,
for example, may pay no federal income tax, yet they, like all
citizens, benefit from federal expenditures in the form of de-
fense, education, and transfer payments.
The limited cases where taxation has been based, at least
to an extent, on a benefits-received theory provide no support
for the corporate tax. For example, social security taxes are
earmarked for the payment of social security benefits. To
some extent, the benefits a worker will receive from the sys-
tem depends on the payments he has made into it. However,
unlike social security where the income from the tax approxi-
mates expenditures, the corporate tax rate bears no relation to
the costs of allowing a business to operate in the corporate
form. Moreover, the modest costs to government that are as-
sociated with the organization of a business as a corporation
generally are borne by the states who charter corporations,
not by the federal government.
It also has been argued that various government services
are provided to corporations and that an assessment based on
corporate profits reasonably reflects the value of such services
to the corporation.35 Government services, however, are pro-
vided to all businesses and cannot justify a special tax on
those operating in corporate form. Moreover, many of the ser-
vices that most directly touch corporations such as police, fire,
and road maintenance services, are provided primarily by
state and local governments. If it is desirable to tax businesses
based on the services provided to them, a tax such as a value-
added tax would be a more appropriate measure of the level
of business activity than a tax based on profits. Although it is
more likely that a value-added tax would be shifted to con-
sumers than would a tax on profits, if the tax on corporations
is justified by a view that government services are a cost of
35. See Barkin, Approaches to the Taxation of Business Income, in REAP-
PRAISAL OF BUSINESS TAXATION 17-18 (Tax Inst. ed. 1962); Groves, How Shall Busi-
ness be Taxed: Basis for Reappraisal, in REAPPRAISAL OF BUSINESS TAXATION 3 (Tax
Inst. ed. 1962).
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production," it is proper to reflect the cost of the tax in the
price of a product.
Finally, the tax is justified on the ground that, regardless
of the cost to the government of the operation of businesses in
the corporate form, shareholders benefit enormously from the
privileges that businesses gain from the corporate form. 7
These benefits, however, bear little relation to the level of cor-
porate profits. Shareholders of unprofitable corporations, for
example, may stand the most to gain from limited liability of
corporations.
C. Effects of the Corporation Tax on the Allocation of
Capital
1. Short-run Effects of the Tax 8
The traditional view is that the corporate tax causes a
misallocation of capital between the corporate and
noncorporate sectors by reducing the return on investment in
corporate equity. This view assumes that the corporation and
its shareholder bear the burden of the tax, rather than shift it
forward to consumers by increasing prices, or backward to la-
bor by decreasing wages.3 9 Adherents of the nonshifting the-
ory argue that corporate profits will reduce the amount a firm
can retain out of its earnings, but that this will have no influ-
ence on prices or wages because any corporate action that
would add to profits after the imposition of a tax would also
have added to profits in its absence. This argument assumes
that firms attempt to maximize profits; however, shifting is
36. See Groves, supra note 35.
37. See Wall, Should Corporations Be Taxed As Such?, in How SHOULD CORPO-
RATIONS BE TAXED? 31 (Tax Inst. ed. 1946).
38. The term "short-run" refers not to a particular period of time, but to a
period set sufficiently short so as to preclude adjustments in fixed capital. Generally,
this is estimated to be one or two years. Conversely, the term "long-run" refers to a
period lengthy enough so that the allocation of fixed capital has adjusted fully to
economic changes.
39. The more common argument is that the tax is shifted by increasing prices
to consumers rather than lowering wages to workers. In the remainder of this paper,
the term "shifting" will mean the passing of the tax to consumers. Commentators'
arguments against shifting are similar, regardless of whether the shifting is forward or
backward.
For an argument that the tax is shifted backwards to labor, see Feldstein, Inci-
dence of a Capital Income Tax in a Growing Economy with Variable Savings Rates,
41 REv. ECON. STUD. 505 (1974) (long-run burden of a general profits tax is likely to
be divided between capital and labor).
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not, however, dependent upon the existence of a competitive
market since a monopolistic or oligopolistic firm would use its
market power to raise prices to the profit-maximizing level re-
gardless of the existence of a tax. 0
The nonshifting theory was challenged by Professors
Krzyzaniak and Musgrave based on an econometric study of
the impact of the corporate income tax on the rates of return
in American manufacturing during the periods 1935-1942 and
1948-1959.41 The professors' approach was to choose variables
they believed were independent of the rate of corporate taxa-
tion, but were statistically related to the determination of cor-
porate profits. Using statistical techniques, they attempted to
isolate the tax variable from other factors influencing profits.
They then examined the impact of changes in the corporate
tax rate upon the rate of return on corporate investment con-
cluding that there was more than 100 % shifting of the tax; an
increase in the rate of the tax actually increased the after tax
return on corporate equity.4 ' Using the K-M method, other
researchers found over 100% shifting in West Germany and
Canada.43
Acceptance of 100% shifting would have a substantial im-
pact on both conventional economic theory and tax policy.
With respect to economic theory, it would require, among
other things, the reassessment of all work based on the as-
sumption that firms generally engage in profit-maximizing be-
havior and that price is determined at the point where margi-
nal cost and marginal revenues are equal. With respect to
tax policy, it would require abandonment of the theory that
corporate source income is subject to the burden of a double
tax; instead, the corporate levy would have the impact some-
40. J. BALLENTINE, EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND THE U.S. CORPORATION INCOME TAX
21-22 (1980); R. GOODE, supra note 4, at 49.
41. M. KRZYZANIAK & R. MUSGRAVE, THE SHIFTING OF THE CORPORATION INCOME
TAX (1963) [hereinafter cited as K-M STUDY].
42. Id. at 66.
43. Roskamp, The Shifting of Taxes on Business Income: The Case of West
Germany, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 247 (1965); Spencer, The Shifting of the Corporation In-
come Tax in Canada, 2 CAN. J. ECON. 21 (1969).
44. See generally Slitor, Corporate Tax Incidence: Economic Adjustments to
Differentials Under a Two-Tier Tax Structure, in EFFECTS OF CORPORATION INCOME
TAX 151 (M. Krzyzaniak ed. 1966); Cragg, Harberger & Mieszkowski, Empirical Evi-
dence on the Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 75 J. POL. ECON. 811, 811-12
(1967); Mieszkowski, Tax Incidence Theory: The Effects of Taxes on the Distribu-
tion of Income, 7 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1103, 1116 (1969).
1983]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
what like a general sales tax on corporate production, albeit
an unusual sales tax because it would be levied at a rate re-
lated to the corporation's profits rather than on the product's
value.4
The K-M study has been criticized for both methodologi-
cal errors and the absence of a persuasive underlying theory."
The basic methodological criticism is that the K-M model
fails to isolate successfully the tax variable from other vari-
ables influencing profits. Because the model fails to determine
adequately corporate profits in the absence of a tax, the tax
variable is forced to bear the burden of explaining the level of
profits. 47 Thus, it is argued, Krzyzaniak and Musgrave showed
only the existence of a correlation between pre-tax profits and
the corporation tax, not a causal relationship.48 Indeed, one
commentator suggests that the causal connection may be re-
versed: a rise in the profits rate may make Congress more will-
ing to raise the corporation tax rate. 9 It has also been noted
that the K-M theory implies that increases in the corporate
tax rate were responsible for almost all the rise in corporate
profits from the 1936-1939 period to the 1955-1957 period, a
highly implausible conclusion."
Critics of the shifting theory also note that some empiri-
cal studies have found little or no shifting.5 1 These studies
45. See R. GOODE, supra note 4, at 66.
46. Any empirical study of the incidence of the corporate tax faces substantial
hurdles. Many factors other than the tax rate influence corporate earnings, for exam-
ple, changes in the productivity of labor and capital, nontax-induced shifts in de-
mand, changes in monetary and fiscal policies, movements in the business cycle, and
modifications in the policies of foreign trading partners. See Cragg, Harberger &
Mieszkowski, supra note 44, at 811.
47. See, e.g., Goode, Rates of Return, Income Shares and Corporate Tax Inci-
dence, in EFFECTS OF CORPORATION INCOME TAX 227-28 (M. Krzyzaniak ed. 1966);
Slitor, supra note 44, at 157; Cragg, Harberger & Mieszkowski, supra note 44, at 812;
Mieszkowski, supra note 44, at 1116-20.
48. Slitor, supra note 44, at 200; Cragg, Harberger & Mieszkowski, supra note
44, at 811-13.
49. Cragg, Harberger & Mieszkowski, supra note 44, at 813.
50. Goode, supra note 47, at 216-20.
51. See, e.g., Gordon, Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax in U.S. Manu-
facturing 1925-62, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 731 (1967); Hall, Direct Shifting of the Corpo-
rate Income Tax in Manufacturing, 54 AM. EcON. REV. 258 (1964); Oakland, Corpo-
rate Earnings and Tax Shifting in U.S. Manufacturing, 1930-1968, 54 REv. ECON. &
STAT. 235 (1972); Turek, Short-Run Shifting of a Corporation Income Tax in Manu-
facturing, 10 YALE ECON. ESSAYS 127 (1970); but see Dusansky, The Short-Run Shift-
ing of the Corporation Income Tax in the United States, 24 OXFORD EcON. PAPERS
357, 359 (1972) (found over 100% shifting based on a model where profits were not
[Vol. 23
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were based upon varied hypotheses about firm behavior, rang-
ing from an assumption of profit-maximization52 to an as-
sumption of mark-up pricing.58 Not surprisingly, the method-
ology of these studies has also been challenged. 4
Various theories have been offered for the alleged ability
of corporations to shift the tax, but these theories are unper-
suasive. It is argued that businessmen, especially in noncom-
petitive markets, may not wish to charge all that the traffic
will bear5 5 and that managers may consider the tax as a cost
of production and set prices to cover production costs with a
margin for profit.5 6 It has also been suggested that managers
may strive for a target rate of after-tax earnings and adjust
their prices to reach that target,5 7 and that firms in an unsta-
ble oligopoly may use a tax increase as a signal to raise
prices.58
The implication of these theories is that most firms do
not seek to both maximize profits and have substantial mar-
ket power.5" Although some researchers believe firms may
seek to maximize sales rather than profits once a minimum
acceptable profit level has been achieved, 60 the acceptance of
widespread nonprofit maximizing behavior would require the
rejection of most conventional economic analysis" and the
the only corporate goal). Although most studies have found either virtually no shift-
ing or close to 100% shifting, a few have concluded that partial shifting occurs. See,
e.g., 2 CARTER COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 144 (one-third shifting within 3 to 5
years); Mikesell, The Corporate Income Tax and Rate of Return in Privately-Owned
Electric Utilities, 1948-1978, 28 PuB. FIN. 291 (1973). The empirical evidence on
shifting from less developed countries is also mixed. See Lent, supra note 1, at 730.
52. Oakland, supra note 51.
53. Gordon, supra note 51.
54. See, e.g., Krzyzaniak & Musgrave, Discussion, in EFFECTS OF CORPORATION
INCOME TAX 247 (M. Krzyzaniak ed. 1966); Musgrave, Discussion, 54 AM. ECON. REV.
300 (1964). For excellent summaries of the debate over short-run shifting see J. BAL-
LENTINE, supra note 40, at 12-19 and Mieszkowski, supra note 44, at 1116-20.
55. Goode, supra note 47, at 207.
56. Id.
57. Id. See Slitor, supra note 44, at 141.
58. Goode, supra note 47, at 209; Slitor, supra note 44, at 141.
59. See Goode, supra note 47, at 211-12; Gordon, supra note 51, at 754-55.
60. See Baumol, supra note 9; Williamson, supra note 9. See also Dusansky,
supra note 51, at 359; Slawson, supra note 6, at 665. Slawson suggests that a firm in
an oligopolistic industry may not set prices at a profit-maximizing level either be-
cause it may fear antitrust actions or because side payments would be required to
induce other firms to maintain the prices that would result in maximum industry-
wide profits.
61. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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market power needed for 100% shifting would require a much
greater concentration of industry in the United States than
actually exists.6 2 The magnitude of the alleged shifting also
calls its validity into question. The K-M finding of 134%
shifting implies that a corporation earning a pre-tax rate of
return of 10% in the absence of a tax would increase its pre-
tax rate of return to over 25% if a 50% corporate tax were
introduced. s
In light of the mixed empirical data, the far stronger the-
oretical case for the nonshifting hypotheses should be given
substantial weight." In the remainder of this article, it will be
assumed that the burden of the tax is primarily borne by
shareholders. Even if the tax were completely shifted, how-
ever, integration still might be desirable since a shifted tax
could cause economic distortions by acting as an arbitrary
sales tax on goods produced by profitable corporations, if the
tax were shifted forward to consumers, or by acting as an
equally arbitrary tax on the employees of such corporations, if
the tax were shifted backward to labor. 5 In either case, the
tax would be regressive.6 The shifting of the tax would cut
strongly against integration only if no unshifting would occur
after its removal. Although there is some econometric evi-
dence that suggests unshifting might not occur,67 this evidence
is weak and lacks a persuasive theoretical foundation.
62. See J. BALLENTINE, supra note 40, at 17.
63. See Goode, supra note 47, at 209.
64. Krzyzaniak and Musgrave themselves admit that the 100% shifting hypoth-
esis cannot be accepted fully in the absence of a study based on a complete theoreti-
cal model. Krzyzaniak & Musgrave, Corporation Tax Structure: A Response, 78 J.
POL. EcON. 768, 770 (1970).
Attempts have been made to explain 100% shifting using theoretical models that
assume firms do not attempt to maximize profits. See Levy, Professor Baumol's
Oligopolistic Model and the Corporation Income Tax, 16 PuB. FIN. 366 (1961);
Cauley & Sandler, The Short-Run Shifting of the Corporation Income Tax: A Theo-
retical Investigation, 20 PuB. FIN. 19 (1974). These studies have been challenged,
however, because they assume that the corporation tax does not reduce "normal prof-
its"-but only "pure profits"-those in excess of normal profits. See J. BALLENTINE,
supra note 40, at 26; Ballentine, Non-Profit Maximizing Behavior and the Short-
Run Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 7 J. PuB. ECON. 135 (1977).
65. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
66. See 1 CARTER COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 27; M. KRZYZANIAK & R. Mus-
GRAVE, supra note 41, at 66.
67. M. KRZYZANIAK & R. MUSGRAVE, supra note 41, at 66.
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2. Long-run Effects of the Tax
The classical view is that in the long-run, after all adjust-
ments in fixed capital have occurred, the corporate tax will be
shifted to all owners of capital. 8 This will occur because the
tax will decrease the return on equity invested in the corpo-
rate sector relative to other equity, diverting capital from that
sector to corporate debt or to noncorporate investment. 9 The
extent of the investment shift depends on how valuable it is
to use the corporate form and how elastic the capital supply is
with respect to the rate of return.70 This shift in investment to
the noncorporate sector will result in a reduction in the yield
on noncorporate equity and an increase in the pre-tax yield on
corporate equity. At equilibrium, both corporate and
noncorporate after-tax yields will be equal; but, because the
tax induces a shift in investment from more productive uses
in the corporate sector to less productive uses in the
noncorporate sector, total production will be reduced. 71 The
shift to noncorporate investment leads to a change in business
form as well as to a change in the type of production as well
as the form of doing business, because certain industries, such
as heavy manufacturing or transportation, may find the cor-
porate form more important than others, like retailing and
farming."
The tax-induced shift in investment from more valuable
uses in the corporate sector to less valuable uses in the
noncorporate sector is claimed to lead to a significant welfare
loss.7" Harberger's estimate of a loss equal to 0.5% of the
68. Even in the traditional view, consumers or workers may bear some of the
burden of the tax as a result of shifts in the allocation of capital. For example, if steel
production can be conducted only by corporations and the corporation tax reduces
investment in that sector, the resulting reduction in steel production will lead to a
lessening of the demand for, and wages of, steel workers. Similarly, the tax will in-
crease the price of goods produced by corporations, harming consumers who purchase
disproportionate amounts of these goods.
69. See R. GOODE, supra note 4, at 58; Harberger, supra note 22, at 215-20.
70. See Goode, supra note 47, at 208.
71. Harberger, supra note 22, at 219.
72. See R. GOODE, supra note 4, at 56.
73. Harberger, Efficiency Effects of Taxes on Income from Capital, in EFFECTS
OF CORPORATION INCOME TAX 108 (M. Krzyzaniak ed. 1966). Efficient allocation of
capital exists when all uses of capital result in equal marginal product. By making the
cost of capital higher to corporations than to noncorporations, capital will be allo-
cated so that the value of the marginal product of capital will be higher in corporate
than in noncorporate use. This analysis assumes that the dollar value of the marginal
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gross national product is often cited by proponents of integra-
tion. 74 A more recent paper by Fullerton, King, Shoven, and
Whalley concluded that the present system results in a wel-
fare loss of 1% as compared with a fully integrated tax sys-
tem.75 An additional welfare loss is said to occur because the
reduction of the rates of return on all investment caused by
the tax may induce individuals to choose current consump-
tions instead of savings, thus inhibiting the rate of capital for-
mation and economic growth.71
Despite economic theory which indicates that the corpo-
rate tax leads to shifts in investment from the corporate to
noncorporate sectors, there is no convincing empirical evi-
dence that such a shift occurs because of the tax. 77 Both the
Harberger and F-K-S-W estimates of the welfare loss depend
on many unproven assumptions about factors such as the ef-
fect of corporate tax on the level of government services and
the elasticity of the labor supply and of savings.7 s It is also
uncertain whether reduced rates of return on investment lead
to a decline in savings since the rate of savings may be in-
versely proportional to the rate of return on investment if in-
dividuals save to reach a target level of accumulation. 71 More-
over, the European experience with dividend relief provides
no evidence that the reduction of the corporate tax through
dividend relief actually leads to a growth in the savings rate. 0
product of a firm equals its marginal value to society. See 4 CARTER COMMISSION,
supra note 14, at 19-20.
74. C. McLURE, supra note 1, at 26 (drawing from findings in Harberger, supra
note 73).
75. Fullerton, King, Shoven & Whalley, Corporate Tax Integration in the
United States: A General Equilibrium Approach, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 677, 677 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as F-K-S-W].
76. Krzyzaniak, The Long-run Burdens of a General Tax on Profits in a Neo-
classical World, 22 PuB. FIN. 472 (1967).
77. See Goode, supra note 47, at 229.
78. One commentator characterized the Harberger estimate of welfare loss as
relying on such "sweeping assumptions" that "it is difficult to take seriously." J.
WISEMAN & M. DAVENPORT, THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE TAX-
ATION 43-44 (1974). Any calculation of efficiency gains from integration also must con-
sider costs that may be associated with the transition from the present system to an
integrated one.
79. See David, Economic Effects of the Capital Gains Tax, 54 AM. ECON. REV.
288, 290 (1964); Feldstein & Frisch, Corporate Tax Integration: The Estimated Ef-
fect on Capital Accumulation and Tax Distribution of Two Integration Proposals,
30 NAT'L TAX J. 37, 42-43 (1974).
80. See Gourevitch, supra note 11, at 82.
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In sum, it is uncertain to what extent the corporation tax in-
duces substantial welfare losses by distorting intersectoral al-
location of capital.
D. Debt v. Equity Financing of Corporate Investfnent
The current corporate tax system favors debt over equity
financing because the interest on debt is deductible from the
corporation's taxable income while dividend payments are
not.' The consequent overreliance on debt financing is
claimed to cause a welfare loss by increasing the vulnerability
of corporations to bankruptcy."2 In addition, the different
treatment of debt and equity leads to costly litigation regard-
ing how a particular instrument should be classified. 3
The majority view that the corporate tax favors debt
financing has been challenged, however, by some theorists.8 4
In particular, the assertion that reliance on debt financing dis-
torts investment decisions, because creditors will demand
higher interest rates to offset costs associated with bank-
ruptcy,85 has been questioned on the grounds that such costs
may not be large enough to play a significant role in a firm's
decision making.8" There is no empirical evidence, however,
proving that any actual welfare loss occurs because of a tax
induced emphasis on debt financing. The evidence is even in-
conclusive as to whether the tax significantly alters the debt
to equity ratio. A German study, for example, found that the
proportion of corporate capital investment financed by new
equity dropped in that country despite the passage of a re-
81. See ALI Study, supra note 2, at 330.
82. See C. McLURE, supra note 1, at 26; Warren, supra note 1, at 736.
83. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS § 4.02 (1979); Warren, supra note 1, at 737. For a general discus-
sion of the debt-equity issue see Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of
Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369 (1971).
84. See Lent, Bond Interest Deduction and the Federal Corporation Income
Tax, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 131, 133-37 (1949); Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261, 264
(1977). See also Stiglitz, Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy and the Cost of Capi-
tal, 2 J. Pus. EcON. 1 (1973) (in the absence of bankruptcy, the optimal investment
decision of the firm is unaffected by tax structure). But see Asimakopulos &
Burbidge, Corporate Taxation and the Optimal Investment Decisions of Firms, 4 J.
PuB. EcON. 281 (1975) (Stiglitz fails to account for the requirement that the long-run
equilibrium after-tax returns in the corporate and noncorporate sectors must be
equal).
85. See Warren, supra note 1, at 734 n.46.
86. See Miller, supra note 84, at 262-64.
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duced tax rate on dividend distributions.8 7 Further, a compar-
ison of the debt-equity ratios of firms in the United States
revealed no significant change between the 1920's and the
1950's, despite a quintupling of the corporate tax rate.8 8 A
study of'corporate behavior in the United Kingdom, on the
other hand, concluded that the tax advantages of debt financ-
ing explained more than 80% of the variation in the debt to
equity ratio during the years studied. 9
If a bias in favor of debt exists, it is clearly much stronger
with respect to new issues than with respect to retained earn-
ings. In theory, a firm's choice between investing with re-
tained earnings or investing with debt will depend on the tax
rates on personal and corporate income and the effective tax
rate on capital gains, assuming sufficient retained earnings
and no bankruptcy or transaction costs.90 Either debt or re-
tained earnings, however, are always preferable to new eq-
uity."' Because there may be little or no advantage to debt, as
compared to retained earnings, no bias against equity financ-
ing may exist where retentions are readily available to meet a
firm's investment needs.
E. Retained Earnings v. Dividends
Current law favors the retention of earnings over their
distribution as dividends in two ways. First, by retaining earn-
ings, the burden of the individual income tax is deferred. Sec-
ond, the full burden of the individual tax may be avoided en-
tirely if the earnings can be removed at long-term capital
gains rates through redemption of corporate stock or liquida-
tion of the corporation.
Since favorable tax treatment makes it cheaper to finance
investment with retained earnings than with new equity,9 ' it
is argued that this leads to the misallocation of resources be-
cause firms will invest funds internally that might, if distrib-
uted, be invested in projects yielding a higher return.98 The
87. See Gourevitch, supra note 11, at 81.
88. See Miller, supra note 84, at 264.
89. J. BALLENTINE, supra note 40, at 62 (citing M. KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
CORPORATION (1977)).
90. J. BALLENTINE, supra note 40, at 55.
91. Id. at 56; Stiglitz, supra note 84, at 17-19.
92. See J. BALLENTINE, supra note 40, at 55-57.
93. See C. McLURE, supra note 1, at 24.
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tax advantages of using retained earnings also are said to
favor established corporations with the ability to generate
capital internally over emerging corporations dependent on
new equity.9 4 The theoretical argument that the corporate tax
system favors the retention of earnings is supported by find-
ings that the return on investments in the United States
financed by new equity ranged from 14.5% to 20.8%, while
the return on internally financed investment ranged from
3.0% to 4.6%." A study of British firms also found that re-
tained earnings generated a relatively low rate of return.96
Some commentators have argued that the finding that
distributions subject to the "discipline of the market" are in-
vested no more efficiently.9 7 It is also uncertain whether the
elimination of the double taxation of dividends, either
through full integration or through dividend relief, would sig-
nificantly increase the percentage of earnings that are distrib-
uted." In addition, some commentators have argued that it is
desirable for corporations to retain rather than distribute
earnings because retentions will increase the total level of in-
vestment if shareholders would consume rather than reinvest
dividends.9
94. See Gourevitch, supra note 11, at 72.
95. Baumol, Heim, Malkiel & Quandt, Earnings Retention, New Capital and
the Growth of the Firm, 52 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 345 (1970).
96. Whittington, The Profitability of Retained Earnings, 54 REV. ECON. & STA-
TISTICS 152 (1972).
97. See, e.g., Friend & Husic, Efficiency of Corporate Investment, 55 REV.
ECON. & STATISTICS 127, 127-28 (1973). But see Baumol, Heim, Malkiel & Quandt,
Efficiency of Corporate Investment: Reply, 55 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 128, 128-318
(1973).
98. Evidence from the British experience with dividend relief is mixed. Com-
pare Ruben, The Irrelevancy of the British Differential Profits Tax, 74 ECON. J. 347
(1964) (no impact) with Feldstein, Corporate Taxation and Dividend Behavior, 37
REV. EcoN. STUD. 57 (1970) (substantial impact). See also King, Corporate Taxation
and Dividend Behavior-A Comment, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 377 (1971) (some impact,
but much smaller than suggested by Feldstein). The French and German experiences
are even less encouraging. Firms may be reluctant to raise their rate of distribution
out of a fear that they may be unable to maintain the higher level. This reluctance
may be because dividends are believed to indicate the profitability of the firm and
thus influence the future cost of capital to it. Thus, firms may change their dividend
policy only when they believe there has been a long-term change in their profitability.
See Lynch & Witherall, The Carter Commission and the Saving Behavior of Cana-
dian Corporations, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 57 (1969).
99. See Gourevitch, supra note 11, at 72-73. See also R. MUSGRAVE, FISCAL RE-
FORM IN BOLIVIA 320 (1981); Feldstein & Frisch, supra note 79, at 41-42 (study of the
United States from 1929 to 1966 indicates one dollar of retained earnings adds 25%
more to total private savings than one dollar of dividends); Lynch & Withrell, supra
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F. Distributional Impact of the Corporation Income Tax
Supporters of integration argue that the corporate tax
system violates vertical equity because corporate income is
taxed relatively more heavily for lower bracket taxpayers than
it is for upper bracket taxpayers, especially when most corpo-
rate income is retained.100 Moreover, if the price of shares is
discounted to reflect investment by middle income individu-
als, corporate investment may be highly advantageous to the
wealthy. 10 1
The fact that lower-bracket taxpayers are disproportion-
ately "overtaxed" when they invest in corporate equity does
not mean, however, that the elimination of the tax would have
a progressive effect. Investment in corporate shares is heavily
concentrated in the upper economic classes. The top one per-
cent of taxpayers receives almost 50% of corporate divi-
dends. 10 2 This concentration of corporate stock among top
bracket taxpayers may occur, in part, precisely because they
are least harmed by the double tax, although the ability of the
wealthy to save a relatively high proportion of their income is
probably a more important factor. Thus, despite the greater
overtaxation of the poor on corporate investment, most corpo-
rate taxes are paid by upper income individuals. 03 Any inte-
note 98, at 59-60 (full integration might result in a substantial decline in corporate
savings, harming economic growth).
100. McLure, supra note 13, at 536-42. It is assumed here that a progressive tax
system is desirable. Progressive taxation has been justified on a number of grounds.
First, the wealthy may receive disproportionately more benefits from the government
than the poor. See C. GALVIN & B. BITTKER, THE INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE
SHOULD IT BE? 52-54 (1969). Second, it has been claimed that all individuals should
pay a proportionate amount of their discretionary income in taxes. Since high income
taxpayers have a greater percentage of discretionary income, this requires a progres-
sive tax. Third, money may have a diminishing marginal utility so that social welfare
is increased by the equalization of wealth. Fourth, proportionate sacrifice may require
a progressive tax system, since a $1000 burden to a $10,000 taxpayer may be greater
than a $10,000 burden to a $100,000 taxpayer. Finally, it is argued simply that a just
society would act to minimize economic inequality. For a general discussion of the
progressive tax, see Blum & Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19
U. Cm. L. REV. 417 (1952).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 15-30.
102. See ALI study, supra note 2, at 348; R. GOODE, supra note 4, at 77; Slaw-
son, supra note 6, at 630; Surrey, supra note 10, at 339.
103. Break & Pechman, Relationship between the Corporation and Individual
Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 341, 344 (1975). See also Gourevitch, supra note 11,
at 71, 76 (German dividend-relief primarily aided upper income individuals). See text
accompanying notes 21-27.
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gration proposal must take into account the actual concentra-
tion of stock ownership among wealthy investors who
purchased shares at a price discounted because of the tax.
Eliminating the corporation tax through integration would
provide these investors with windfall gains by increasing the
after-tax profits of firms doing business in the corporate form.
Proponents of dividend relief have responded to the
windfall argument in several ways. First, they argue that in
the long-run lower and middle income taxpayers would bene-
fit from integration because dividend relief reduces the impact
of the corporation tax proportionally more for lower bracket
shareholders than it does for upper bracket taxpayers. This
reduction, however, is of little use to middle and lower income
individuals who may lack the funds to buy shares in the first
place and it seems unlikely that stock ownership among the
nonwealthy would increase significantly as a result of dividend
relief. 104
A second response, offered by Warren in a recent article
advocating dividend relief, is that the discount hypothesis re-
mains unproven'05 and that the "fragmentary" empirical evi-
dence that does exist indicates that corporate stock has not
generally sold for less than the assets it represents.' 06 The
study by Gordon and Bradford10 7 that Warren cites as sug-
gesting that stock prices are not discounted provides little
support for that claim, however, even if its assumptions and
methodology are accepted. Gordon and Bradford found that
the marginal value of a dollar of dividends is regarded by the
104. See Gourevitch, supra note 11, at 80 (dividend relief in France did not
increase stock ownership in the lower and middle classes).
105. Warren, supra note 1, at 728 n.32, 757. In theory, share prices would be
discounted because of the corporate tax so long as the corporation bore the burden of
the tax. A rejection of the discount hypothesis thus implies acceptance of the shifting
hypothesis. Full shifting of the corporate tax, however, requires that firms not engage
in profit-maximizing behavior. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. But
Warren explicitly assumes that firms do maximize profits. Warren, supra note 1, at
731 n.37.
106. Id. at 757 (citing Gordon & Bradford, Taxation and the Stock Market
Valuation of Capital Gains and Dividends, 14 J. PuB. EcON. 109 (1980)). It is hardly
surprising, however, that there is no conclusive empirical evidence proving the exis-
tence of a discount. As in the determination of the incidence of the corporation tax, it
is extraordinarily difficult to isolate the effect of the tax. See Warren, supra note 1, at
757 n.113 (quoting Shoup, The Dividend Exclusion and Credit in the Revenue Code
of 1954, 8 NAT'L TAX J. 136, 144 (1955)).
107. Gordon & Bradford, supra note 106.
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market as equivalent to a dollar of retained earnings. 08 This
finding cannot support the claim that overall share prices re-
flect the value of the underlying assets or that the elimination
of the tax would not lead to a windfall. Bradford himself has
argued from an analysis of an admittedly highly simplified
model of a tax on corporate distributions that "in so far as
partial integration amounts to eliminating a tax on distribu-
tions, it may result primarily in windfall wealth redistribution,
reversing the, by now, irrelevant wealth changes that occurred
when the tax was introduced . . . ."109 Moreover, there is sub-
stantial theoretical support for the discount theory." 0
A third response to the windfall argument is that almost
all changes in the tax law have a retroactive effect and lead to
a windfall or penalty to some group of taxpayers."' Thus, it is
argued that it would unduly restrict tax reform if otherwise
desirable changes in the tax law were rejected because penal-
ties or windfall gains might result."' The fact that most tax
reforms will disproportionately benefit or penalize particular
segments of the population does not, however, mean that
windfalls and penalties should be ignored in the formation of
tax policy. Rather, the unfairness of allowing the windfall or
penalty must be compared with the benefits of the proposed
reform on a case-by-case basis.
A fourth argument is that the possibility of favorable tax
changes may be capitalized into the price of shares, making it
inaccurate to characterize gains due to tax modifications as
windfalls." 3 This argument has little merit even if one accepts
the contention that financial markets correctly evaluate un-
108. See id. at 111.
109. Bradford, The Incidence and Allocation Effects of a Tax on Corporation
Distributions, 15 J. PUB. EcoN. 1, 3 (1981). See also 4 CARTER COMMISSION, supra
note 14, at 27-28 (Canadian integration would create unwarranted benefits to share-
holders unless coupled with full taxation of then tax-free capital gains).
110. See supra notes 15-30 and accompanying text.
111. See Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Tax Revi-
sions, 126 U. PENN. L. REV. 47, 63 (1977). Graetz contends that it would be appropri-
ate to eliminate retroactively the tax exemption on state and local bond income. Id.
at 61. But this seems precisely the type of tax where a grandfather clause is desirable.
First, it would be quite easy to administer such a clause by simply allowing a tax
exemption to all bonds issued before a certain date. Second, because the purchases of
tax exempt bonds paid a premium for them because of their tax advantage, it seems
unfair to remove that advantage.
112. Warren, supra note 1, at 757-59.
113. Id. at 757-58.
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likely events such as major structural changes in the tax law.
The capitalization argument could justify any expropriation of
property, even one that is now considered unconstitutional,
since the market could have capitalized the possibility, how-
ever remote, that such an expropriation would take place. In
addition, the mere fact that an investor might have paid a
small premium for his stock because of the remote chance of a
favorable tax change does not make gains as a result of such a
change less of a windfall. Moreover, since most investors are
unlikely to plan for remote contingencies, hardships may re-
sult if individuals are subject to significant unforseeable
changes in their financial status. Although the gains to share-
holders from integration would not create hardships, it may
be desirable for the government to adopt a consistent policy
of minimizing the retroactive impact of tax changes where it is
feasible to do so.
A final response to the windfall argument is that any loss
of progressivity as a result of integration could be offset by
changes in the marginal rate schedules. Thus, it is argued, is-
sues of vertical equity are relatively unimportant and integra-
tion should be judged by its effects on horizontal equity, re-
source allocation, and corporate financial policy." 4 Even if
changes in the tax rate offset the overall loss in progressivity,
however, individuals with particularly large stockholdings
would obtain a windfall. More important, the enactment of
integration would be unlikely to be accompanied by an in-
crease in the progressity of the rate structure, given the likely
political opposition to such a change.
The Canadian experience is instructive regarding the
politics of tax reform. In 1966, the Royal Canadian Commis-
sion on Taxation released its famous "Carter Commission Re-
port.""' 5 This comprehensive proposal included among its rec-
ommendations the full integration of the corporate and
personal income taxes." 6 The top individual and corporate
tax rates were to be harmonized at 50% and each resident
shareholder was to include in his income his share of divi-
114. C. McLURE, supra note 1, at 40.
115. See CARTER COMMISSION, supra note 14.
116. For a discussion of the Carter Commission report and the controversies
surrounding it, see Bucovetsky & Bird, Tax Reform in Canada: A Progress Report,
25 NAT'L TAX J. 15 (1972). For a critical comment on the Carter Commission propos-
als, see Moore, The Carter Report: Some Misgivings, 1 CAN. J. ECON. 195 (1968).
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dends or allocated retained earnings, grossed up by the corpo-
rate tax paid. The shareholder would then receive a refund-
able tax credit for the proportionate share of the corporate
tax paid. Canadian capital gains on corporate shares, previ-
ously not taxed at all, were to be taxed at ordinary rates. The
Commission regarded the integration and capital gains pro-
posals to be linked, believing that the windfall that sharehold-
ers would receive from integration in the absence of full taxa-
tion of capital gains was unwarranted, as would be the burden
of the full taxation capital gains in the absence of
integration. 117
The business community attacked both the Carter Com-
mission proposals' 18 and the "White Paper" reform proposals
issued in 1969"1e which retreated from complete integration,
but still suggested the full taxation of capital gains, introduc-
ing a provision for the periodic deemed realization of gains in
widely traded shares.120 The tax changes that finally emerged
from this process in 1971 contained neither integration of re-
tained earnings, full taxation of capital gains, nor deemed re-
alization of corporate shares. However, the changes did con-
tain provisions for partial dividend relief, a proposal favored
by the business community and by wealthy taxpayers. 2' The
Canadian government argued that the modifications made in
the Carter Commission proposals indicated its responsiveness
to the wishes of Canadian taxpayers, but in reality only the
views of the small but vocal business segment of the commu-
nity were heard. 12 2
The prospects for comprehensive reform appear no better
in the United States. A study of the revenue effect of the im-
plementation of Carter Commission-style integration in the
United States indicated that several controversial reforms,
such as the full taxation of capital gains and social security
benefits and the elimination of most personal deductions,
would be necessary if revenue lost by eliminating the corpora-
117. 4 CARTER COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 27-28.
118. Gourevitch, supra note 11, at 85-86.
119. HON. E. BENSON, PROPOSALS FOR TAX REFORM (1969).
120. At one point up to 7,000 letters of protest arrived at the capital each day,
as the financial press and business groups rallied opposition. In particular, the provi-
sions calling for integration and deemed realization of accrued share gains came
under attack. Bucovetsky & Bird, supra note 116, at 22-23.
121. Id. at 25.
122. Id. at 39.
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tion tax were to be replaced without substantially raising indi-
vidual rates.1 23 The prospect of passage of such reforms is
bleak. Proponents of integration in the United States are split
between supporters of full integration, largely from academia,
and supporters of dividend relief, who are more often drawn
from the business community. 2 " The campaign to enact ei-
ther full integration or a comprehensive tax reform package
which would include dividend relief and the full taxation of
capital gains might well result in the passage of only dividend
relief instead. Once such relief is enacted, it may be difficult
to generate support for further integration.
In sum, the distributional impact of integration is a cause
for serious concern. The elimination of the corporate income
tax would lead to windfall gains to shareholders who are
predominantly from the wealthiest sector of the population.
Such gains would reduce vertical equity and might undermine
respect for the tax system among middle and lower income
taxpayers. The arguments that such a windfall should be ac-
cepted are not persuasive. Although integration proposals that
result in a windfall should not be rejected out of hand, it is
important to balance the likely gains from any integration
proposal against the potential loss in equity and to search for
ways to achieve the goals of integration without allowing a
windfall to current shareholders.
III. INTEGRATION PROPOSALS
A. Dividend Relief
Dividend relief eliminates the corporate tax on distrib-
uted earnings while leaving the separate tax on retentions in-
tact. The two basic techniques of implementing dividend re-
lief are the dividends paid deduction method and the
withholding method. Under the dividends paid deduction
method, the corporation is allowed to deduct distributed earn-
ings from its taxable income, much as interest can currently
be deducted by the corporation. Under the withholding
123. Pechman & Okner, Simulation of the Carter Commission Tax Proposals
for the United States, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 2, 3, 12 (1969).
124. See Conable, Aspects of Legislative Persuasion: Congress, 32 NAT'L TAX J.
307 (1979); Surrey, supra note 10, at 335; Surrey, Tribute to Dr. Laurence N. Wood-
worth: Two Decades of Federal Tax History Viewed From This Perspective, 32
NAT'L TAX J. 227, 236-37 (1979).
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method, the corporation pays taxes at the corporate rate on
all its earnings but shareholders are allowed a credit for, and
must include in income, the corporate taxes paid on the earn-
ings distributed to them. Each method leads to identical
results.1 25
Dividend relief is touted as eliminating or reducing the
distortions caused by the separate tax on corporate profits.
From the individual investor's viewpoint, it eliminates the
bias against investing in corporate equity as long as corporate
earnings are not retained. Even where such earnings are re-
tained, it reduces that bias.' Thus, dividend relief lessens
the welfare loss, if any, caused by a tax induced misallocation
of resources between the corporate and noncorporate sec-
tors.12 7 It also reduces any bias against investment in general
which may be caused by the burden that the corporate tax
places on all capital. 28
Dividend relief would also eliminate any bias, from the
corporation's viewpoint, in favor of debt over equity financ-
ing,'12 so that any increased risk of bankruptcy caused by tax-
induced reliance on debt financing would be eliminated. Fur-
ther, it is argued that dividend relief would encourage corpo-
rations to increase the portion of earnings distributed as divi-
dends, improving the allocation of capital by subjecting funds
to the "discipline of the market."1 0
The elimination or reduction of any economic distortions
which may be caused by the corporate tax is desirable. There
is no empirical evidence, however, that the tax leads to a sub-
stantial welfare loss; the experience of European countries
with dividend relief provides little evidence that it actually
leads to increased capital investment,' 3 ' higher dividend pay-
out rates,182 or reduced reliance on debt financing. 33
The speculative gains from dividend relief must be
weighed against its administrative and equitable costs. Al-
125. McLure, supra note 13, at 554-56; Warren, supra note 1, at 744-45.
126. See Warren, supra note 1, at 746 (retaining earnings will benefit upper
bracket and harm lower bracket taxpayers).
127. See supra notes 38-80 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
129. Warren, supra note 1, at 747-49.
130. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
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though administrability is not an especially serious problem
for dividend relief proposals, policy decisions must be made
concerning such matters as the treatment of tax preferences'
and nonresident taxpayers. 35 Equitable considerations are a
more serious problem since dividend relief would provide an
unfair windfall for upper bracket taxpayers.1 36
B. The American Law Institute Reporter's Study Proposals
Like dividend relief, the ALI Reporter's Proposals are
designed to eliminate the biases caused by the corporate tax,
but, unlike dividend relief, they attempt to avoid windfall
gains to current owners of corporate stock. 3 7 The ALI study
proposes a deduction for dividends paid on new equity at a
rate equal to the interest deduction that would have resulted
from an equivalent level of debt financing." If dividends are
less than the maximum allowable deduction, with respect to
the new equity, the difference is carried forward for three to
five years.139 Further equalization of the treatment of debt
and equity is achieved by limiting the corporate interest de-
duction from debt instruments held by 10% or greater share-
holders to the rate allowed on new equity.14 0 The bias in favor
of redemptions over dividends also is eliminated by subjecting
non-dividend distributions to a corporate-level excise tax. 4
C. Evaluation
The ALI proposals offer substantially more promise than
simple dividend relief. Like dividend relief, they largely elimi-
nate the bias in favor of debt over new equity and in favor of
noncorporate over corporate investment by ending the
"double tax" on new equity. Unlike dividend relief, however,
the ALI Reporter's Proposals neither result in a windfall to
current shareholders nor lead to a dramatic loss in tax reve-
134. See C. McLURE, supra note 1, at 92-145.
135. Id. at 185-214.
136. See supra notes 99-124 and accompanying text.
137. ALl Study, supra note 2, at 328-29. For a general description and discus-
sion of the ALI proposals, see Beghe, The American Law Institute Subchapter C
Study: Acquisitions and Distributions, 33 TAx LAW. 743 (1980).
138. ALI Study, supra note 2, at 366.
139. Id. at 369.
140. Id. at 368-69.
141. Id. at 442.
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nues because no dividends paid deduction is allowed for earn-
ing attributable to old equity. The ALI proposals also increase
the uniformity and preserve the progressivity of the tax sys-
tem by insuring that funds removed from corporate solution
bear a tax burden similar to the tax on ordinary dividends.
The ALI proposals have been attacked by Professor War-
ren, however, as being less neutral among various forms of in-
vestment than dividend relief.142 In particular, Warren argues
that under the ALI Reporter's Proposals the yield on an in-
vestment in a corporation that retains all earnings is less than
the yield on a noncorporate investment.
Consider an individual with $100 to invest under the
ALI Draft proposal, where tax and return rates are the
same for corporate and individual investors, as is often
assumed in the Draft. If he invests on individual account
or in nonshareholder debt, he will have $162.89 on disin-
vestment if the tax rate is 50%, the pretax rate of return
is 10%, and all earnings are reinvested for ten years. But
if he invests in new corporate equity, with earnings re-
tained for ten years, a shareholder will have only $156.45
on disinvestment, even if the distribution in year ten is
deductible as a dividend to the extent of 10% times the
years invested times the initial equity contribution. 43
Warren's calculations assume that a corporation retains
all earnings. In such a case the maximum dividends paid de-
duction on a ten-year investment of $100 of new equity is only
$100 (.10 x 10 years x $100). 144 This deduction is insufficient
to provide for the tax-free distribution of all profits derived
from the new equity because retained earnings are not
deemed new equity for purposes of calculating the maximum
dividends paid deduction, even where the retained earnings
are derived from new equity. If corporate earnings are distrib-
uted annually, however, and are subsequently reinvested by
the shareholders in the corporation, such earnings would be
deemed new equity, thus increasing the allowable dividends
paid deduction and causing corporate and noncorporate in-
vestments to have equivalent yields. The results cited by War-
ren can only be reached if the corporation retains all earnings
142. Warren, supra note 1.
143. Id. at 755-56 (footnotes omitted).
144. See id. at 756 n.108.
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to the disadvantage of its shareholders. Full deductability of
earnings on new equity could also be achieved by deeming
such earnings to be new equity for purposes of calculating the
maximum dividends-paid deduction.
Warren's main objection to the ALI Reporter's Proposals
is that they do not lead to identical yields for corporate and
noncorporate investments.14 But the largest difference in in-
vestment yields occurs where a corporation retains all of its
earnings and, as just explained, this case is based on question-
able assumptions. If this case is eliminated, Warren's calcula-
tions show that the after-tax returns for various types of in-
vestment by a top bracket taxpayer range from $128.63 to
$134.39 under the ALI proposals, as compared with a range of
$134.39 to $137.73 under dividend relief.146 Given the limited
evidence that a significant welfare loss is caused by the much
greater differences now existing in the yields on corporate and
noncorporate investment, it seems sensible to accept the
slightly greater variation under the ALI Reporter's Proposals
to prevent windfall gains to current shareholders.
Professor Warren, however, is unwilling to accept these
variations and proposes eliminating the differences that re-
main under dividend relief because of the advantage of defer-
ral where the maximum personal rate exceeds the maximum
corporate rate. He would accomplish this by reducing the
maximum individual rate to the corporate level and allowing
corporations to make deemed allocations of retained income
to shareholders. 47 Under such a constructive dividend rule
top bracket shareholders would suffer no effect from the allo-
cation, while lower bracket shareholders would receive refunds
because the corporation would have overpaid the tax on in-
come attributable to their share of corporate income.1" 8 Pro-
145. Id. at 769.
146. Compare id., at 767, with id., at 747.
147. Warren, supra note 1, at 746. At the time Warren's article was published,
the top personal rate was 70%. The reduction of the top individual rate to 50% has
largely eliminated the advantages of deferral.
It would be possible to permit or require the deemed allocation of retained earn-
ings to shareholders even if the top personal rate exceeded the corporate rate. Under
such a system, if a corporation made few or no distributions, a top bracket taxpayer
would be required to pay taxes despite no actual receipt of cash with which to pay
them. This is not a serious problem, however, since such an individual could easily
raise cash by selling some of his shares or by borrowing against them.
148. Id.
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fessor Warren points out that such a proposal was suggested
by the Canadian Carter Commission as a "corollary of integra-
tion."'14 The Canadian integration proposal, however, tied in-
tegration to a substantial broadening of the tax base, includ-
ing the full taxation of the previously tax-free appreciation of
corporate shares, so that the reduction of the top individual
rate would not provide a windfall to upper income
taxpayers. 5°
Warren also suggests a one time windfall gains tax as an
alternative to the ALI proposals.' 5 ' No method of taxing
windfall gains is proposed, however, and such a tax may be
extraordinarily difficult to design since it would be impossible
to isolate the influence of dividend relief from other factors
influencing the price of shares.
IV. CONCLUSION
The separate tax on corporate income is criticized for cre-
ating a bias against investment in corporate equity, for caus-
ing overreliance on debt financing of corporations, and for en-
couraging the retention rather than distribution of corporate
profits. Some economic waste may occur from each of these
biases, but the evidence suggests that such waste may be less
significant than many proponents of integration claim. If
these biases are to be reduced through the partial integration
of the corporate and personal taxes, the ALI Reporter's Pro-
posals should be adopted rather than dividend relief because
the ALI proposals do not lead to windfall gains for current
shareholders.
149. Id.
150. 4 CARTER COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 27-28. Warren himself also favors
wider reforms, including full taxation of capital gains and the taxation of redemptions
at ordinary rates. Warren, supra note 1, at 737. He does not, however, make his en-
dorsement of dividend relief contingent on the enactment of these other reforms.
151. Warren, supra note 1, at 759.
[Vol. 23
